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Abstract
This paper reviews the arguments for and against the ‘Stability
and Growth Pact’ signed by the countries of the Euro area. We find
the theoretical debate to be inconclusive, as both externality and cred-
ibility arguments can be used to yield opposite, and equally plausible
conclusions. We also argue that evidence in favour of a Pact-like rule
is scant. We therefore suggest the view that the Stability Pact is a
public social norm, and that a country’s adherence to that norm is in
fact a response to the need to preserve reputation among the other
members of the European Union. Using this extreme but not implau-
sible hypothesis, we build a simple model similar in spirit to Akerlof’s
(1980) seminal paper on social norms, and we show that reputation
issues may cause the emergence of a stable but inferior equilibrium.
We further show that after the enlargement, with a number of coun-
tries anxious to prove their ‘soundness’ joining the club, the problems
posed by the pact/social norm are likely to increase.
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1 Introduction
This paper extends to public behaviour the framework introduced by Ak-
erlof’s (1980) seminal contribution on social norms. Akerlof shows that social
norms, even when costly to follow for individuals, may nevertheless persist if
disobedience entails a loss of reputation. We argue that ‘public social norms’
may limit national governments’ ability to manoeuver when building and
managing an economic and monetary union, and yet survive because of rep-
utation considerations. More specifically, the public social norm we consider
in this paper is the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), signed in 1997 by the
countries participating in the European Monetary Union.
Social norms and their eﬀect on economic behaviour and outcomes have
been investigated at length. The essays collected by Hechter and Opp (2001a)
show the variety of definitions of norms, and the disagreement among scholars
about their emergence and persistence. We do not intend to enter into this
debate, but rather we highlight some general characteristics of social norms,
in order to clarify our claim that the Stability Pact is one of them.
At the core of this literature is the observation that the need for social
acceptance contributes to determine individual behaviour. Social psycholo-
gists have long studied group behaviour, and the tendency to conformity. In
a series of experiments Asch (1951) shows that members of a group, even
when capable of making the right choice when deciding in isolation, tend to
conform to group decision regardless of whether the decison is correct or not.
One of the explanations for group conformity (e.g. Buchanan and Huczyn-
ski, 1997), may be that groups establish social norms, and punish deviation.
This set of findings serves as a justificatiion for Harsanyi’s (1969) postulate
that social recognition plays a role along with economic gain in determining
the behaviour of economic agents. In other words, ‘persons want to be rich
and famous - the and-famous part of the expression not being redundant’
(Akerlof, 1980, p.753). The postulate helps in giving a general definition.
Regularity in behaviour is a norm if: first, members of the society gener-
ally conform to it; second, deviance is disapproved; third, the fact that most
people conform to the norm helps to enforce it (Pettit, 1990).
Such a definition has two important consequences. The first is that agents
may follow the social norm even when it is against their own economic in-
terest, if the gain in reputation or social esteem is suﬃciently large.1 What
matters is a concern for reputation rather than an immediate impact on pri-
1Contrary to the game theoretic literature, that defines reputation as the coherence
between ex ante and ex post behaviour (reputation is equivalent to credibility), the liter-
ature on social norms defines reputation in more general terms, as the positive eﬀect on
welfare coming from the acceptance by other members of the community.
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vate (or social) welfare. The second and related consequence is that the norm
does not necessarily originate within the sphere of investigation of economics:
scholars seem to agree on the fact that the emergence of social norms is case
specific, as on the socio-historical conditions that led to it (Hechter and Opp,
2001b). Thus, when discussing the norm ‘Stability Pact’ below, we will give
some reasons that may explain why that specific norm emerged in the first
place.
The paper by Akerlof (1980) captures well the above-mentioned discus-
sion. Firms, fearing a loss of reputation, are willing to pay a wage perceived
as ‘fair’ and higher than the market clearing one, thus obtaining suboptimal
profits; on aggregate, this causes involuntary unemployment. Freely obeyed
social norms may thus result in constraints on individual behaviour as well
as in departures from the optimal equilibrium.
The fear of reputation losses may of course be justified on the ground of
economic rationality. For example, in Akerlof, competent workers aware of a
firms’s bad reputation would refrain from applying for a job in that firm. In
other words, the presence of reputation in the utility function may be seen as
the result of a ‘meta-maximization’ problem in which reputation serves as a
means towards other ends (Becker, 1976). Nevertheless, Elster (1989) warns
against the temptation to think that norms are always disguised expressions
or vehicles of self interest, so that they can be treated as any other element in
the utility maximization process. He gives examples of norms that are hard to
reconcile with self or common interest, that are nevertheless obeyed2. Elster
argues forcefully that ‘to accept social norms as a motivational mechanism
is not to deny the importance of rational choice. [...] Actions typically
are influenced both by rationality and by norm. Sometimes, the outcome
is a compromise between what the norm prescribes and what rationality
dictates. [...] At other times rationality acts as a constraint on social norms.
Many people vote out of civic duty, except when the costs become very high.
Conversely social norm can act as a constraint on rationality.’ (Elster, 1989,
p. 102).3
The transition towards the European Monetary Union was dominated by
the Maastricht criteria (in particular limits to deficit and debt), later crystal-
lized in the SGP. These restrictions were accepted even by governments which
2A trivial, and yet forceful, example is that bus riders do not pick their nose. They
want others to think that they ‘know how to behave’, even if they will never meet again.
3Elster echoes a tradition on social norms rejecting the utilitarian (or functional) ap-
proach that we describe in the text. For authors like Habermas and Rawls the social
norm emerges when individuals accept limitations to their behaviour in order to form a
community. Thus, norms mark the passage from the state of nature to civil society (Forsé
and Parodi, 2005). This approach, dominant in sociology, is a minority view in economics.
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were opposed to their design; many countries encountered serious problems
conforming to the criteria, and the only immediately visible benefit was the
increased reputation of their governments. This is why we argue that the
current fiscal setting has the features of a social norm, in that governments
follow its prescriptions primarily because the others are following it. We make
this working hypothesis because it is diﬃcult to be convinced by the ratio-
nale underlying the European economic government. The main reason for a
supranational rule as the Stability Pact is given by the negative externalities
of fiscal profligacy, that via the interest rate may aﬀect the level of activity
of other members of a monetary union. We will show nevertheless that the
theoretical debate is inconclusive, that empirical evidence in favour of the
Pact is weak, and that some other explanation for its persistence deserves to
be explored.
The question of why governments have accepted such a constraining rule
is all the more important because in a monetary union national governments
have few instruments left, with the commonmonetary policy preventing them
from setting interest and exchange rates. Furthermore, the single EMU inter-
est rate has diﬀerentiated eﬀects on the dynamics of public debt: countries
‘enjoying’ the lowest rate of inflation will suﬀer from the highest level of real
interest rate.
The reputation argument may not be as odd as it looks at first glance. The
design of European institutions is such that decisions in most fields are the
outcome of a bargaining process between the diﬀerent governments. Thus,
credibility and the bargaining power of each government may depend on
reputation among its peers (the meta-maximization problem defined above).
If a government wants to earn or maintain a good reputation, for example in
order to use it in other negotiation venues, then it may be valuable to obey a
norm that is not directly beneficial, simply because it is followed by the other
governments. We argue in other words that the European Council resembles
a Club where members obey a social norm to earn social acceptance.
In light of these considerations, the enlargement that took place in May
2004 is a major source of concern (see also Buiter and Grafe, 2004). It is
plausible that, with the increase of heterogeneity, the need of stabilization
policies to cushion asymmetric shocks will increase, as will do the cost of
obeying a norm that limits such policies. If the norm is strong enough to
resist the increased pressure, then the negative welfare consequences for the
EU may be substantial.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section will briefly describe
the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, discusses the theoretical
arguments underlying the Pact, and argues for their inconclusiveness. Then,
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in section 3 we highlight a number of features of the SGP that corroborate
our interpretation as a social norm. Our model, a simple extension of Akerlof
(1980) in which obedience to the norm is induced by reputation considera-
tions, will be presented in sections 4 and 5, where we also show the eﬀects of
enlargement when a norm like the Pact is in place. Section 6 concludes and
suggests themes for further research.
2 The Debate on Fiscal Rules and on the Sta-
bility Pact
The institutions of Europe, in their actual design, stem from two main
sources. The first is the founding Treaty signed in Maastricht in 1991, and
the second is the Stability and Growth Pact4 that, negotiated together with
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 completes the setup.
The Maastricht Treaty defined the convergence criteria that countries had
to fulfil in order to be admitted to the single currency area. In particular, it
required a deficit to GDP ratio of no more than 3%, and a public debt below
60% of GDP, or approaching that level at a ‘satisfactory pace’. The vagueness
of the latter requirement allowed to overlook it for high debt country as Italy,
Belgium and Greece.
The SGP contains further provisions regarding fiscal policy that have the
objective of increasing transparency and control on public finances. Each
year member countries present a Stability and Convergence Programme, to
be examined by the European Commission and the Council. The programmes
have to contain a medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close
to balance or in surplus, together with an account of the adjustment path to-
wards the objective. The requirement to attain a position of close to balance
or surplus in the medium term is an important innovation with respect to
the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, it implies the strong consequence that public
debt as a ratio to GDP should tend asymptotically to zero, a position hard
to justify per se (De Grauwe, 2003).
The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) states what deviations from the
3% budget deficit ceiling are acceptable, and gives the Council the right to
sanction (by qualified majority) the countries not respecting it. The EDP
has first been invoked for Portugal (for the 2001 deficit). In November 2003
the Council decision to ‘forgive’ France and Germany, triggered an unprece-
dented clash with the Commission, which had recommended sanctions to be
4The SGP consists of a Resolution of the European Council (OJ 1997, C 236/1), and
two Council Regulations (1466/97 and 1467/97)
4
imposed. The Commission sought a judgement by European Court of Jus-
tice, that ruled against the Council in July 2004. In the spring 2004 the
Excessive Deficit Procedure was also invoked for The Netherlands, Greece,
and six newly admitted countries, while for Italy the Council and the Com-
mission waited June 2005. As of today (July 2007), no country has been
sanctioned.
The prolonged period of soft growth experienced by most euro zone coun-
tries (especially the largest ones), and the increasing number of countries
struggling to maintain their deficits within the limits set by the Pact, have
triggered a debate on the flaws of the current fiscal framework, and on pos-
sible reforms aimed at a better functioning of fiscal policy in Europe (for de-
tailed accounts of the debate on reforming the Pact see Buti et al., 2005, and
Monperrus-Veroni and Saraceno, 2006). The constitutional Treaty signed
in Rome in October 2004 had left substantially unchanged the provisions
regarding fiscal and monetary policy, but the long political process has fi-
nally yielded a first result in the reform adopted by the European Council
in March 2005: the 3% and 60% limits remain unchanged, and no automatic
mechanism (such as a golden rule or a ‘debt related’ rule) is put in place. Nev-
ertheless, on one side the medium term objective of a zero structural deficit
is relaxed for countries with low debt and/or with high potential growth;
and on the other it contemplates a number of circumstances (e.g. a strong
engagement in costly structural reforms) allowing temporary deviations from
the deficit ceiling, and longer delays for correcting them.
When discussing fiscal policy one should clearly separate the issue of
whether it exists a deficit bias requiring rules to constrain fiscal policy, from
the issue of whether a supranational norm like the SGP is needed. In fact,
economic commonsense and the principle of subsidiarity would require rules
to be country-specific and left to the choice of national governments, unless
it were argued convincingly that the eﬀects of suboptimal fiscal policy spill
over to the other members of a monetary union. This crucial distinction has
unfortunately often been neglected in the debate on the SGP. As we will
see several arguments exist in favour of the existence of a deficit bias; while
these arguments may be more or less robust (if the debate were settled, why
countries adopting fiscal rules remain a small minority?), it is safe to say that
most economists agree on the existence of deficit biases in practice, and on
the need of some type of rule to limit suboptimal uses of fiscal policy.
Nevertheless, the existence of a deficit bias per se is not enough to justify
a supranational rule in a monetary union. Thus, for our purposes we need to
focus on arguments entailing some sort of spillover between countries, that
would justify such a rule. In the remainder of this section we will first outline
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strenghts and weaknesses of these arguments; and then, for completeness, we
will give a short account of the more general debate on the utility of fiscal
rules.
The main theoretical foundation of the Stability Pact is a simple exter-
nality argument: a government running a budget deficit has to borrow; in a
monetary union this is supposed to raise the common interest rate, and to
have restrictive eﬀects both on public expenditure (the area-wide increased
interest payments reduce government consumption and investment possibili-
ties), and on private consumption and investment in the other countries. This
negative externality would induce national governments — free from the con-
trol of foreign exchange markets — to run excessive budget deficits, allowing
them to make the other countries pay part of ‘the bill’.
The empirical evidence in favour of this claim rests on several contri-
butions concluding that expansionary fiscal policy has a positive eﬀect on
interest rates.5 Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that this literature cannot
be invoked to support the externality argument. In fact, none of these pa-
pers looks at the eﬀects on the rates of partner countries, but only on own
rates. The need for a common rule has to originate from common eﬀects
of government behaviour, domestic eﬀects having to be taken care of by na-
tional policies and/or rules. As the evidence on domestic interest rates is not
extremely robust, it would be extremely surprising if a study gave empirical
arguments in favour of common rules, by finding important eﬀects of fiscal
policy on interest rates at the European level.6
More importantly, from a theoretical viewpoint, the externality argument
can be reversed. Suppose that a country implemented an unwarranted ex-
pansionary fiscal policy, while close to full employment; this would result in
inflationary pressure, and hence in reduced competitiveness. If on the other
hand the deficit responded to a slump in production, it would sustain de-
mand and hence income and imports. In both cases, the increased demand
for the other countries’ production would yield larger fiscal revenues and
lower deficits. Models with either negative or positive fiscal policy spillovers
have flourished in the recent literature;7 but nothing, from a theoretical point
5To cite just the most recent ones, Laubach (2003), Ardagna et al. (2004), Canzoneri
et al. (2004). These results nevertheless are not extremely robust, as other studies are
inconclusive (Mehra, 1992; Cunningham and Vilasuso, 1994), or find negative correlation
(Caporale and Williams, 2002).
6Landon and Smith (2000) find some eﬀect of provincial debt in Canada, and the cred-
itworthiness of the other provinces. These eﬀects are nevertheless small, and the authors
do not clearly take position between a market based and a rule based approach to fiscal
discipline.
7Examples of negative spillovers are in Andersen and Sorensen (1995), Jensen (1996),
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of view, may induce one to think that the negative externality would be larger
in size than the positive one. Indeed simple reasoning leads to believe the
contrary: generally, a fiscal expansion in a region does not have negative ef-
fects on other regions of the same country. Given the short life of the EMU,
we will have to wait some more time for empirical work to help shed some
light on this debate.
Interest rate spillovers may also operate through a diﬀerent channel. De-
tken et al. (2004) show that bond substitutability in a monetary union
widens the savings pool at which governments can draw to finance deficits,
thus weakening the interest rate costs of excessive deficits. Governments can
thus free ride in a monetary union. This mechanism, (that incidentally run
against the one described above, and may explain why empirically the eﬀects
of deficit on interest rates are not robust) would call for a national rule, as
the interest rate costs are paid by the country itself, and no spillovers appear.
A second argument in favour of a supranational rule is credibility: exces-
sive deficits may end up in insolvency, forcing the Central Bank to intervene
(against its own statute) to bail out the country involved; otherwise, banks
owning the debt would see their financial soundness hampered, and face the
risk of depositors’ runs (Artis and Winkler, 1999). The moral hazard aspect
of excessive deficits could hence undermine the Central Bank’s credibility
in its commitment to fight inflation. Furthermore, as the costs of an ECB
bailout would be sustained by all EMU citizens, this would encourage irre-
sponsible behaviour of governments. A constraint on deficits can avoid this
risk.
This argument may be dismissed on several grounds. First, a debt crisis
seems scarcely plausible in the present context. Since 1945, even in far more
turbulent times, European countries never seriously risked default on their
debt. Furthermore, a study on OECD countries by Alesina et al. (1992)
showed that markets are capable of monitoring fiscal performance and ex-
certing disciplinatory pressure on governments through interest rate spreads.
Bernoth et al. (2004) show more specifically that this capacity was not
weakened by the inception of EMU. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) fur-
and Catenaro and Tirelli (2000). Some rely on the adverse eﬀect of interest rate increases
described in the text, while others focus on negative terms of trade eﬀects. The classic
book by Mundell (1968) assumed positive demand spillovers, that also emerge in Dixon and
Santorini (1997), and Beetsma et al. (2001). The trade eﬀect may be oﬀset by exchange
and interest rates, variations (Fitoussi and Phelps, 1988), but these arguments clearly do
not apply to a monetary union. Levine and Brociner (1994) present a model in which all
these externalities play a role, and argue that the negative ones probably dominate the
positive ones. Allsopp et al. (1995) also discuss at length the diﬀerent eﬀects at work in
a monetary union, and reach the conclusion that decentralization of fiscal policy is likely
to provide insuﬃcient stabilization.
7
ther notice that in contrast to Mexico and East Asia during the crises of
the 1990s, the European banking system exposure and the term structure
of public debt seem more solid, so that the bailout risk is not particularly
important. They further argue that such a risk would be better dealt with
by improving public debt management and bank regulation.
The credibility argument is also less robust than it may appear. The
Pact was designed assuming that governments would accumulate surpluses
in good times to allow the operation of automatic stabilizers in bad times8.
This ideal scenario though, did not take into account at least two complica-
tions: the first, correctly predicted by Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998), is
that this symmetry would only be attained after a long transition; during this
transition, which is still happening, governments are being forced to restric-
tive fiscal policies irrespective of the business cycle phase. To make things
worse, the Pact was signed at the end of a long phase of convergence to the
Maastricht criteria, that involved procyclical fiscal policies during at least
the years 1995-97. When growth later resumed in Europe, this in turn pro-
voked -in the attempt to restore ‘normal’ levels of taxation and expenditure-
expansionary policies. For all these reasons the Euro area economy has ex-
perienced, especially since the end of the US expansion of the 1990s, an
explosive combination of depressed growth and (procyclical or at best neu-
tral) restrictive fiscal policy induced by the convergence to Maastricht criteria
first, and by the Stability Pact after. Mainly because of high debt service,
the three largest countries -Germany, France and Italy- do not have room for
the automatic stabilizers to play, so that fiscal policy is ineﬀective even facing
transitory shocks. This extremely diﬃcult situation is already resulting in
creative accounting experiments, and in increasing pressure to revise, soften,
or simply ignore the Pact. Even worse, the impossibility of using the fiscal
instrument is inducing governments and economists to put pressure on the
ECB for a more expansionary monetary stance, undermining the support for
the fight against inflation. Finally, the repeated violations of the Pact, and
the recent legal controversies between the Commission and the Council have
further reinforced the belief that the current institutional setting is inappro-
priate. These phenomena seem far more threatening, for the credibility of
the European institutional system as a whole, than the bailout risk.
Turning now to the more general issue of fiscal policy rules, the theoretical
debate has revolved around the reasons for a deficit bias on the part of the
government. These reasons are exhaustively discussed by Schuknecht (2005).
8‘Nevertheless, the problem, with the Pact as presently framed is that it is all stick
and no carrot; rewarding good fiscal behaviour in booms rather than, or in addition to,
punishing bad behaviour in slumps, would certainly make better sense’ (Bean, 1998, p.106).
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The most trivial is fiscal illusion of myopic voters, who tend to reward gov-
ernments promising tax cuts or expenditure increases, because future fiscal
contractions are not properly accounted for. This is related to the strategic
behaviour of governments that use fiscal policy and deficits to increase their
chances to be re-elected, or at least to reduce the room of manoeuvre for
their successors. Another explanation sees the government as the negotia-
tion forum for the demands of vested interests; the compromises that emerge
from this bargaining process will also be associated with excessive deficits.
Finally, Calmfors (2005) cites the literature on dynamic inconsistency that
shows how governments not committing to fiscal or monetary discipline will
tend to run deficits (or to create surprise inflation) in the attempt to expand
aggregate demand and income. In a world populated by rational agents this
attempt will result in higher inflation but no changes in income.
An argument in favour of fiscal rules builds on the literature that flour-
ished in the 1990s on the Non-Keynesian eﬀects of budget deficit reductions
(e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Perotti, 1999;
Alesina et al., 2002). Broadly speaking, the argument goes as follows: if
the budget deficit reduction is credible and significant, it may trigger the
expectation of a permanently lower share of government spending in GDP.
The consequent upward revision of permanent income, will cause private con-
sumption and investment increases, and hence be expansionary. This will in
turn reinforce the initial debt consolidation (the channels described in the
various papers diﬀer, but the basic mechanism remains the same). Again,
the argument is not convincing. First, the literature cited above finds that
empirically this eﬀect has had more chances to overcome the standard Key-
nesian deflationary eﬀect when public finances are in distress (Perotti, 1999).
Nevertheless, the situation of European countries’ public finances can hardly
be described as unsustainable or explosive. The argument might serve as
a basis for a Maastricht-type limit, but certainly not for the balanced bud-
get rule required by the Stability Pact. Furthermore, as happened with the
Pact, a rule may have the perverse eﬀect of inducing governments to find
loopholes and shortcuts to meet the requirements, actions that will hardly
have a positive eﬀect on private expectations. Finally, the arguments in
favour of expansionary eﬀects of a fiscal contraction suggest its una tantum
nature. Advocating these eﬀects to justify a long term rule does not seem
appropriate9.
Another popular argument in favour of the Pact maintains that excessive
budget deficits are inherently unfair because they shift to future generations
the burden of current expenditure. This is important, and should be appro-
9We thank Robert Solow for suggesting this argument.
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priately developed, by fully considering future costs and benefits of current
deficits. If anything, the SGP is biased against future generations, in that it
does not distinguish between current and capital expenditures. Deficits may
be reduced by cutting financing for a high speed train, or by reducing pub-
lic wages; nevertheless the latter measure being politically costlier, it is less
likely to be implemented (see Creel et al., 2007, who analyze the eﬀects of
public investment on growth, and discuss the application of the ‘Golden rule’
to the UK). Furthermore, a rigorous analysis would in fact have to consider
that future benefits may come from a variety of current expenditures (e.g.
those assuring well functioning educational and health systems) and not only
from public investment.
On a completely diﬀerent note, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) argued
that governments had a fixed amount of political capital to spend in unpop-
ular measures, and the Pact forced them to spend it on fiscal consolidation,
rather than on more needed measures like labour market or pension reforms.
To sum up, while the theoretical debate on the existence of deficit bi-
ases and the ensuing need for some kind of fiscal rule seem to have become
consensual, the empirical foundations for such rules, and for supranational
measures like the Stability Pact do not look nearly as solid. Such mixed re-
sults may explain why, in spite of the consensus in the academic profession,
the instances where fiscal rules have been adopted in practice are quite rare.
3 Fiscal Discipline or Social Acceptance?
The inconclusiveness of economic arguments in favour of the SGP is at the
basis of our claim that other factors, namely reputation, may be used to
explain why most countries of the EMU have adopted strict and often pro-
cyclical fiscal policies even when suﬀering from low growth, and lack of policy
instruments. This claim also rests on a number of features of the Pact that
remind characteristics of social norms recalled in the introduction. First, the
circumstances that led to the Stability Pact. Stark (2001) or Heipertz and
Verdun (2004) give accurate accounts of its genesis, that could explain why
reputation in the European ‘club’ is founded on a sound fiscal position, and
not on more sensible measures of public welfare, like low unemployment or
high GDP growth. As happens for other social norms (e.g. what determines
a ‘fair’ wage?) the answer seems to lie in a mix of historical, social and polit-
ical factors: Germany’s historically strong aversion to inflation that made its
government give up its monetary sovereignty only in exchange for an insur-
ance of prudent fiscal behaviour. Alternatively it could be, as many argue,
the desire of core countries to keep out of the union the so-called ‘club Med’
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nations (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Furthermore, the rule persisted
even after the special circumstances that originated it have disappeared (to
the point that Germany was, between 2003 and 2006, one defaulting mem-
ber of the club), a sort of hysteresis that is also common among other social
norms. A second element in favour of our interpretation is the sanctioning
scheme associated with the Pact; we will argue in what follows that the sanc-
tions are not likely to be imposed, because too heavy and delayed. In fact
until now sanctions for deviating countries have simply taken the form of a
public reprimand (i.e. the starting of an Excessive Deficit Procedure). If this
is the case then, it appears that the eﬀorts of most countries to respect the
provisions of the Pact are dictated by the need for social recognition rather
than by the fear of actual costs. Whatever its origins may be, we are inter-
ested in the eﬀects that the social norm ‘Stability Pact’ has on government
behaviour and social welfare. One point should nevertheless be stressed:
most private social norms have their origin in a notion of fairness, implying
that agents behave in such a way as to refrain from taking full advantage of a
(possibly temporary) dominant position (Hicks, 1974). Social norms of this
type may even been considered as a way to address the so called ‘zero contri-
bution’ problem, namely that ‘unless the number of individuals in a group is
quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make
individuals act in their common interest, rational, self interested individu-
als will not act to achieve their common or group interests’. (Olson, 1965,
p.2). Norms constraining public behaviour may also have the same origin,
the quest for common interest. But by definition -because they are written
at a particular moment- they cannot reflect the outcome of a repeated game.
For this reason they are often entrenched in some doctrine representing the
current economic paradigm, and may survive after it disappears (the political
economy explanation). The threat of social sanctions is enough to make it
rational to obey the norms.
While we outlined a number of reasons why the SGP has the features
of a social norm, there may be other reasons for the emergence of a sub-
optimal arrangement in Europe. For instance, an anti-inflationary coalition
would benefit from a rule constraining demand side interventions and making
supply side interventions (structural reforms) inevitable10. Such a political
economy interpretation is certainly convincing in explaining why the Stability
Pact emerged in its current form. Nevertheless, it presupposes an ideological
homogeneity of European governments and vested interests that does not
seem to be observed in practice. Once we need to explain why more inter-
10In a similar vein Fitoussi (2006) speaks of an ‘hidden agenda’ that the current Euro-
pean institutions help to push.
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ventionist governments ended up accepting an agenda that ran contrary to
the interest of their constituencies, reputation appears again as a plausible
and appealing explanation.
The Stability Pact is not the only instance of a social norm constrain-
ing public behaviour in recent European history. In the early 1990s, the
obedience to the theoretically dubious requirement of maintaining exchange
rate parities vis-à-vis the German mark had most of the features of a social
norm. In fact some governments believed these parities to be crucial for their
reputation. Adherence to that norm led to a strongly procyclical monetary
policy, similar in many respects to the widely studied (e.g. Clarke, 1967)
British experience of the 1920s. As a result, Europe entered a period of slow
growth and mounting unemployment that lasted almost six years.
In the next section we present a simple model derived fromAkerlof (1980),
in which we show that an ineﬃcient equilibrium caused by a social norm can
be sustained, if deviation from the norm causes a loss of reputation. The
existence of a social norm may therefore result in a lower level of income for
the area as a whole.
4 The Model
This section introduces a static, very stylized model of public choice and
reputation. In general terms, the government’s objective function has two
arguments, welfare of the population, and reputation among its peers. This
general setting may be applied to various problems; in this paper we assume
that the welfare measure is the output gap,11 whereas reputation stems from
obeying the Stability Pact, and giving up income stabilization. Consistently
with our previous discussion, we assume that positive and negative external-
ities linked to budget deficits wash out, so that they do not play a role in the
model.
Suppose we have an economic union of mass 2 (the reason for this choice
will be clear shortly below). Each country belonging to the union (indexed
by i) is very broadly described by an aggregate demand relationship, and by
a stochastic process describing private demand:
yi = ci + gi (1)
ci = yn + εi
11By targeting the output gap, on one side the government reduces variability of income,
therefore reducing uncertainty for its citizens; on the other, it sustains employment and
per capita income, both linked to individual welfare.
12
Total income in country i is simply the sum of private (ci) and public (gi)
expenditure, that for sake of simplicity can be viewed as deficit spending.
The natural or potential level of income (yn) is given by the deterministic
part of private consumption, and it is assumed to be equal across coun-
tries. We assume that the shock has a uniform distribution with zero mean:
εi ∼ U(−a, a).12 Government expenditure gi can be decomposed into a dis-
cretionary part, gd,i and an automatic stabilization ga,i, that is assumed to
partially stabilize output (γ < 1):
gi ≡ ga,i + gd,i (2)
ga,i = −γεi
The government objective is to set gd,i in order to minimize deviations
from the natural rate of income (the output gap). We assume that it acts
after the shock is realized. Suppose nevertheless that a social norm is in
place, call it ‘Stability Pact’. This norm stems from a political process, and
has no clear economic justification; it considers values of gi larger than a
threshold g¯, i.e. excessive deficits, as ‘bad’. Each government knows that, by
breaking the norm, it will gain the undesired reputation of a ‘naughty boy’.
The objective function is a loss minimization
min
gd,i
Li = α (yi − yn)2 +Ri (3)
Notice that our formalization rules out any deficit bias, as governments do not
try to push output above its natural level; this has the important implication
that no conflict with the Central Bank arises, and we can avoid modelling
monetary policy.13 Ri is the loss linked to a bad reputation. We assume that
the loss of reputation is proportional to the fraction of governments that
believe in the norm, μ, and that it does not depend on the magnitude of gi.½
Ri = 0 if gi ≤ g¯
Ri = β2μ if gi > g¯
(4)
Obviously, for positive shocks the government faces no choice, and it
stabilizes the economy. A government facing a negative shock faces a two
step problem: (a) decide whether to break the norm and stabilize (gi > g¯ ⇒
Ri > 0), which it will do if the shock is large enough; and (b) if the norm is
12Given the assumption of mass 2, the density function is f(x) = 1/a. Notice that this
assumption about the shocks rules out ex ante correlation between income in the countries.
13A deficit bias would simply shift towards a positive average deficit the equilibrium of
the economy, thus leaving unaltered the logic of our argument. By ruling out deficit biases,
we are not concerned by strong empirical results like those of Fatás and Mihov (2003).
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broken, what level of gd,i to choose. The problem can be tackled backwards,
remembering that if the code is broken the reputation loss is not linked to
the size of stabilization. Substituting equations (1) and (2) within equation
(3), we obtain
min
gd,i
α [gd,i + (1− γ)εi]2 +Ri (5)
whose solution is
gd,i = −(1− γ)εi ⇒
½
gi = −εi
yi = yn
(6)
If the government chooses to use discretionary policy to complement auto-
matic stabilization, income remains at its natural level.
On the other hand, if the government opts for obedience to the norm,
total expenditure will be limited by the threshold g¯, and yi − yn = g¯ + εi.
This implies that regarding the choice of whether to stabilize, the loss in the
two cases (S/F, stabilize/follow the norm) will be½
LSi = Ri = β
2μ
LFi = α [g¯ + εi]
2 (7)
The norm will be followed only if LFi < LSi , i.e. if
|εi| ≤ ε¯ = β
r
μ
α
+ g¯ (8)
Thus, the larger the reputation loss (high β), and the lower the weight given
to the output gap (low α), the higher the threshold ε¯, i.e. the shock govern-
ments will endure without intervening to stabilize. On the other hand, if the
rule were made less stringent (larger g¯), more governments would follow the
norm (larger ε¯).
For computational simplicity, and without any loss of generality, from now
on we will assume that g¯ = 0, meaning that any deficit will be sanctioned by
a reputation loss. Furthermore, when referring to the ‘union’ or the ‘area’,
we will focus on the part of governments faced with negative shocks, that
has unit mass, and a distribution of shocks εi ∼ U(−a, 0).
Short term equilibrium
In the short term the fraction μ of believers in the norm is given. As the
shock has a uniform distribution, the fraction of governments following the
norm, i.e. those for which the absolute value of the shock is small enough, is
x =
β
a
r
μ
α
(9)
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Long term equilibria
In the long run, the number of believers in the norm changes according to
their number with respect to the followers.
μ˙ = ϕ(x− μ) ϕ > 0 (10)
where ϕ is a positive multiplicative constant. Thus, if more governments
believe in the norm, than follow it, the number of believers will decrease;
and if the opposite holds, the number will increase. The following proposition
characterizes the long run, or steady state equilibrium (μ˙ = 0):
Proposition 1 Suppose that β > 0; then
(a) Two equilibria may exist, one in which nobody follows the rule, and one
in which a positive fraction 0 < μ∗∗ ≤ 1 of governments follows the rule:
μ∗ = 0 (11)
μ∗∗ = min
µ
1,
β2
a2α
¶
(b) The equilibrium μ∗ is unstable, whereas the equilibrium μ∗∗ is globally
stable
Proof. See Appendix
μ∗ corresponds to the equilibrium without reputation (nobody believes in
the norm, nobody follows it and nobody is sanctioned for that). The other
equilibrium is characterized by a positive fraction of governments following
the rule and hence not stabilizing14. μ∗∗ is inversely related to the parameters
α and a: both a higher weight given to stabilization, and a more unstable
macroeconomic environment, make the rule less sustainable. In particular the
role of the latter parameter may be worth investigation in further research.
Notice that if the sanctions are weak enough (0 < β2 < a2α⇒ μ∗∗ < 1) there
is coexistence, in steady state, of governments stabilizing and governments
abiding by the rule. In the following we will assume to be in such a situation.
Substituting back in equation 8, we obtain the long term value for the
threshold:
ε¯ =
β2
aα
(12)
14As we are only concerned by the welfare eﬀects of the norm, and as μ∗∗ is the only
stable equilibrium, we don’t deal with the emergence of the rule, nor with its robustness
with respect to parameter changes.
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Aggregate income and welfare
At the μ∗ = 0 equilibrium all governments stabilize, and aggregate income
is Y ∗ = yn (the countries hit by negative shocks have unit mass). Accordingly,
aggregate loss is L∗ = 0, as Ri is equal to zero for every i. The equilibrium
with some countries following the rule will on the other hand be characterized
by lower aggregate income and larger aggregate loss.
Proposition 2 Suppose β2 ∈ (0, a2α); then
(a) The μ∗∗ equilibrium, with a positive number of followers of the norm, is
characterized by a lower level of production than the μ∗ equilibrium:
Y ∗ = yn > Y ∗∗ = yn −
β4
2a3α2
(13)
(b) The μ∗∗ equilibrium is inferior: L∗ = 0 < L∗∗ =
μ∗∗β2
a
(a− ε¯) + α
3a
ε¯3.
Proof. See appendix
In this section we proved in the general case that the emergence of a social
norm whose violation involves a reputational loss may yield two equilibria,
one in which the norm is neglected, and the other in which it is followed by
a positive fraction of agents. The latter equilibrium is globally stable, and it
involves both a lower aggregate welfare and a lower average income.
To keep the algebra of the model tractable, in the following we normalize
the shock and the weight to a = α = 1. As a consequence,
μ∗∗ = ε¯ = β2
(14)
L∗∗ = β4(1− 2
3
β2) Y ∗∗ = yn −
β4
2
From now on we will focus on the only stable equilibrium ( μ = μ∗∗).
5 Enlarging the Club: New Members and
Reputation
In this section we explore the eﬀects of the norm in the case of an enlargement
of the union. To do so, we introduce heterogeneity in a peculiar way: we
assume that for exogenous reasons (for example past history) not all countries
suﬀer from the same reputational loss in case they break the code. To keep
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things simple, they are divided in two groups, (b)ad and (g)ood, of mass ν
and 1 − ν respectively. We further assume that countries belonging to the
two groups face the same shocks, have the same natural income, and the
same weight for output stabilization. The only diﬀerence is that reputation
loss is larger for ‘bad’ countries (βg < βb). For each group we can compute
the threshold and the fraction of followers (see eqs. 8 and 9, remembering
that here a = α = 1) :
ε¯j = xj = βj
√
μ j = b, g (15)
The total number of norm followers is then
x = νxb + (1− ν)xg = (νβb + (1− ν)βg)
√
μ = β
√
μ (16)
where we define β ≡ νβb + (1 − ν)βg. The steady state equation and its
nonzero solution (eqs. 10 and 11) are
(νβb + (1− ν)βg)
√
μ− μ = 0
(17)
μ∗∗ = (νβb + (1− ν)βg)2 = β2
Accordingly, the values for the thresholds are
ε¯j = βjβ = βj(νβb + (1− ν)βg) j = b, g (18)
where βg < βb ⇒ ε¯g < ε¯b. Average income for the area can be written as
Y ∗∗ =
Z yn−ε¯b
yn−1
yn dy| {z }
A
+
Z yn
yn−ε¯g
y dy| {z }
B
+
Z yn−ε¯g
yn−ε¯b
(νy + (1− ν)yn) dy| {z }
C
(19)
The integral A collects the countries that do stabilize, because (the ab-
solute value of) the negative shock is above all the thresholds. B represents
countries whose shock is so small that they do not stabilize whatever their
group is. Finally, integral C represents the group of countries for which the
behaviour depends on the group. If they are bad (ν of them), they do not
stabilize, whereas if they are good, they will find it convenient to stabilize.
Equation 19 yields
Y ∗∗ = yn −
1
2
(νε¯2b + (1− ν)ε¯2g) (20)
that is the equivalent of equation (13).
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Notice that, as fewer countries will stabilize, average income in the ‘b’
group will be lower than in the ‘g’ group:
Y ∗∗b = yn −
1
2
ε¯2b < yn −
1
2
ε¯2g = Y
∗∗
g (21)
Hence, even assuming that the natural level of income is the same, the mere
existence of the norm may generate income inequality.
Newly admitted members are usually closely scrutinized to verify whether
they abide by the rules. The ten countries that joined the European Union
in May 2004 are no exception, and though not formally, their public finances
will most probably be subject to stricter controls from the old member states.
In fact, in May 2004 the European Commission issued early warnings for six
of the ten new member states, namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Malta, Poland and Slovakia. Even more plausibly, the newcomers themselves
will do whatever is within their capabilities to show the other participants of
the club that they deserve to be part of it. In terms of our model, this means
that the ratio of governments for which deviations from the norm imply a
higher reputation loss has increased with the enlargement. Assume that the
reputation loss of good countries is a fraction of the reputation loss of bad
countries, βg = xβb, x ∈ (0, 1). The following proposition relates average
income, and its variability, with the ratio of bad governments on the total.
Proposition 3 Assume that 0 < βg = xβb < βb < 1. Then, as the ratio of
bad governments ν increases:
(a) Average income for the area as a whole decreases.
(b) Income variability for the area as a whole, V (Y ), increases, for values of
x suﬃciently low: x < x¯(ν)
(c) The threshold x¯(ν) is increasing in ν: x¯0(ν) > 0
Proof. See appendix
Figure (1) shows the shape of the threshold as a function of ν. If the dif-
ference between good and bad countries in terms of reputational loss is large
enough (x < 2/3) then, income volatility will increase even if the number
of bad members of the club is low. Similarly, if the number of bad countries
is large enough (ν > 1/2), then income volatility will increase even if the
penalty is similar for the two groups. Only the combination of similar penal-
ties (large x) and a large majority of good countries (low ν) could yield a
decreased variability of income; in such a case, the decreased income vari-
ability of good countries would more than compensate the increased income
variability of the bad countries.
The model gives thus an insight on the possible eﬀects of enlargement
in presence of a constraining rule on stabilization policies. If the intuitive
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assumption that entrants will have to be more rigorous than the old members
of the union proves correct, then the norm will become more binding, with
the eﬀect of generally increasing income variability, and reducing the average
income and welfare of the area. We believe that such a risk should be taken
into account when discussing the future institutional setup of the EMU, and
especially when coming to the issue of ‘deepening vs. enlarging’ the union.
Notice furthermore that this result is derived in the most unfavorable case,
given that besides reputation countries are all alike; the negative eﬀects of
the norm would be even more evident if we had allowed for heterogeneity.
6 Conclusion: Enlargement and the Pact
This paper developed the consequences of a strong but plausible premise,
namely that the Stability and Growth Pact has uncertain theoretical justifi-
cations, and that its raison d’être is mainly a reputation issue. In this sense
it may be considered a social norm of the type discussed in the introduction.
The model we presented was willingly kept abstract and simple, in particular
assuming that the system, as described by equations 1, was static; and more
importantly that positive and negative externalities washed out. At the price
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of more cumbersome algebra, we could express the model in terms of growth
rates, keeping the main conclusions unaltered:
— In spite of its lack of economic justification, the norm generates a stable
equilibriumwith lower income and welfare. Furthermore, the higher the
weight attached to reputation loss, the lower the equilibrium income
level.
— Further making the realistic assumption that in case they broke the
Pact, new members would suﬀer a higher loss in reputation than the
others, we showed that the enlargement would further decrease the area
wide average income level, and increase its dispersion. This conclusion
seems to suggest that enlargement may help break the ‘bad’ equilibrium
and help the EU out of the suboptimal social norm.
A few extensions might add to the insights of model. Some would intu-
itively strengthen our results, for example if the model was complicated in
order to keep track of long term variations in potential income. If we con-
sider that, especially in periods of fast technological change, potential output
is plausibly aﬀected (via investment) by protracted periods of low growth,
the dynamics would probably result in even stronger long run negative ef-
fects of a social norm depressing output in the short run. Another extension
that would highlight the negative eﬀects of the Pact is the consideration
of common (instead of independent) shocks. If business cycles are synchro-
nized, then the number of countries breaking the code would be higher in
recession times (something we are observing nowadays). The eﬀect of this
extension on the norm itself (could it be that if a common shock is severe
enough the norm simply breaks down?) would be particularly interesting to
study. On the other hand, the explicit consideration of negative externalities
of budget deficits would soften our conclusion; showing how do externalities
interact with the reputational issue tackled in this paper would certainly be
interesting.
Another topic for future research is the introduction of size eﬀects, that
may aﬀect both the sanctioning scheme, and the influence of deficits on
reputation.
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Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof. Proposition 1
(a)
Equation (10), together with the steady state condition μ˙ = 0 implies
x = μ, i.e. (using eq. 9)
μ =
β
a
r
μ
α
(22)
the two solutions are given in equation (11), and repeated here for conve-
nience:
μ∗ = 0
μ∗∗ = min
µ
1,
β2
a2α
¶
where the formulation for μ∗∗ stems from the fact that μ ∈ [0, 1].
(b)
For notational convenience, define K = βa√α , implying that μ
∗∗ = K2. In
order to study stability, we substitute (9) inside (10), to obtain the following:
μ˙ = F (μ) = ϕ(K
√
μ− μ) (23)
Notice that F (0) = F (μ∗∗) = 0. Furthermore, notice that
lim
μ→0
F 0(μ) = lim
μ→0
1
2
√
μ
− 1 > 0
so that the μ∗ = 0 equilibrium in unstable. Global stability of μ∗∗ requires
F (μ) > 0 ∀μ < μ∗∗ = K2, and F (μ) < 0 ∀μ > μ∗∗ = K2, exactly what we
have (remember that ϕ > 0):
K
√
μ− μ > 0⇐⇒ μ < K2 = μ∗∗
(24)
K
√
μ− μ < 0⇐⇒ μ > K2 = μ∗∗
so that μ∗∗ is globally stable.
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Proof. Proposition 2
(a)
If εi ∼ U(−a, 0), it follows that yi = yn + εi ∼ U(yn − a, yn). Aggregate
(and average) income of the area, when μ = μ∗∗, can then be written as
Y ∗∗ =
1
a
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
Z yn−ε¯
yn−a
yndy| {z }
A
+
Z yn
yn−ε¯
ydy| {z }
B
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ (25)
where A denotes the ‘extreme’ countries, whose shock is large, whereas B
is the income of countries which do not stabilize, and consequently produce
yi = yn + εi. Changing from yi to εi, and collecting the yn term, equation 25
can be rewritten as
Y ∗∗ =
1
a
µ
yn
Z 0
−a
dε+
Z 0
−ε¯
ε dε
¶
=
= yn −
1
2a
ε¯2
= yn −
β4
2a3α2
< yn
(b)
Governments stabilizing will face a reputation loss of β2μ, Countries fol-
lowing the rule will suﬀer a loss of αε2i . Aggregate loss can be written as
L∗∗ =
1
a
µZ −ε¯
−a
μ∗∗β2 dε+
Z 0
−ε¯
αε2 dε
¶
(26)
=
μ∗∗β2
a
(a− ε¯) + α
3a
ε¯3 (27)
=
β4
a2α
µ
1− 2
3
β2
a2α
¶
> 0 (28)
given that β2 ∈ (0, a2α). Thus,
L∗∗ > L∗ = 0
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Proof. Proposition 3
First of all notice that βb > βg ⇒ ε¯b > ε¯g, i.e. that the threshold value is
diﬀerent for countries belonging to the two groups
(a)
Recall that average income is (from equation 20)
Y ∗∗ = yn −
1
2
(νε¯2b + (1− ν)ε¯2g) (29)
whose derivative is
∂Y ∗∗
∂ν
= −1
2
∙
ε¯2b − ε¯2g + 2νb
µ
ε¯b
∂ε¯b
∂ν
− ε¯g
∂ε¯g
∂ν
¶¸
< 0
given that
∂ε¯b
∂ν
=
∂ε¯b
∂β
∂β
∂ν
= βb(βb−βg) >
∂ε¯g
∂ν
= βg(βb−βg) by the assump-
tion βb − βg > 0 which guarantees that the term within square brackets is
positive.
(b)
The variance of income can be written, similarly to the mean, as
V (Y ) =
Z yn−ε¯b
yn−1
(yn − Y ∗∗)2dy +
Z yn
yn−ε¯g
(y − Y ∗∗)2dy +
(30)
+
Z yn−ε¯g
yn−ε¯b
(νy + (1− ν)yn − Y ∗∗)2 dy
Tedious algebra, and substitution of Y ∗∗ with the value from equation
(20), yields
V (Y ) = ν2ε¯3b(
1
3
− 1
4
ε¯b)+ (1− ν)2ε¯3g(
1
3
− 1
4
ε¯g)+ 2ν(1− ν)ε¯2g(
1
3
ε¯g−
1
4
ε¯2b) (31)
Given that βg = xβb,we can write β ≡ (1−ν)βg+νβb = ((1− ν)x+ ν)βb.
Further remembering that with α = a = 1, we have ε¯j = ββj (j = b, g).
Furthermore, take the derivative with respect to ν, divide throughout for β6b ,
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and for notational ease, define b = β2b :
C =
∂V
∂ν
1
β6b
= −3
2
(x+ 1)2 (x− 1)6 bν5
+5
µ
1
2
x (x+ 1) (3x+ 2) (x− 1) b+ 1
3
¡
x2 + x+ 1
¢¶
(x− 1)4 ν4
+4
µ
−1
4
x
¡
15x2 + 20x+ 6
¢
(x− 1) b−
¡
x2 + x+ 1
¢¶
(x− 1)3 xν3
+3
µ
x
¡
5x2 + 5x+ 1
¢
(x− 1) b+ 1
3
¡
2x2 + 4x+ 3
¢¶
(x− 1)2 x2ν2
+2
µ
−1
4
x
¡
15x2 + 1 + 10x
¢
(x− 1) b+ 1
3
¡
2x2 − 4x− 1
¢¶
x3 (x− 1) ν
+
µ
1
2
x (3x+ 1) b− 1
¶
x5 (x− 1)
We want to show that
∂V
∂ν
> 0 ∀x < x¯
We notice that if b→ 0, considering that x, ν ∈ (0, 1),
C|b→0 =
1
3
(1− x)
¡
2xν(1 + x+ x2) + 3x3 + 5ν2(1− x3)
¢
(x(ν − 1)− ν)2 > 0,
and that the derivative of C with respect to b is negative:
∂C
∂b
= − (1− x)
¡
x2(1− ν) + ν
¢ ¡
3x2(ν − 1)− x− 3ν
¢
(x(ν − 1)− ν)3 < 0
Thus, there will be a threshold level of b, such that C = 0 :
C|b=b¯ = 0⇒
b¯ =
2
3
(5ν2(1− x3) + 2x2ν(1 + x) + 2xν + 3x3)
(x2(1− ν) + ν) (3x2(1− ν) + 3ν + x) (x(1− ν) + ν)
For values lower than the threshold we have that C > 0, so that when
b¯ is equal or larger than one, then the derivative of income variance with
respect to ν will be positive. Unfortunately this is not true for any pair
(ν, x) ∈ (0, 1), and we need to define a threshold x¯ for which the variance is
positive, given the other parameters.
An explicit relationship between x and ν is impossible to find, but we can
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study the function at its extremes. When ν → 0, the threshold is
b¯
¯¯
ν→0 =
2
3x2 + x
so that x ≤ 2
3
= x¯ ⇒ b¯ ≥ 1. In other words, whenever x < x¯ = 2
3
, the
variance of income will be increasing in ν. If x→ 1, then we have
b¯
¯¯
x→1 =
1
2
+ ν,
so that b¯ ≥ 1⇒ ν ≥ 1
2
= ν¯
(c)
In the (x¯, 1) and (0, ν¯) range we have to use numerical simulations to
solve for the relationship between the threshold x¯ and the proportion of bad
countries ν.15. The results of the simulation allow to draw figure 1 in the
text, that shows a positive relationship between x and ν.
15The matlab code is available at (web page reference delete for blind refereeing)
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